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ABSTRACT: Considering the way that the world economy has evolved over the last 
30-40 years, there was a transition from a predominant real economy to a predominant 
financial economy. Once, there were prevalent economic crises (when the real economy was 
important); today, the economies all around the world face prevalent financial crises; 
therefore, it is extremely important to study the role of financial markets, especially the 
incomplete markets feature (given by the imperfect information). The paper aims to analyze the 
relationship between imperfect information and incomplete financial markets and the way they 
are affecting the financial stability. 
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1. INFORMATIONAL CHANGES, TRADE, WELFARE AND FINANCIAL 
INSTABILITY 
 
The value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in 
the asset markets in order to reallocate risk is very important, because information 
allows a welfare improvement when portfolios can be freely reallocated. If markets are 
sufficiently incomplete, the welfare effects are arbitrary: there are changes in 
information that may improve or worsen the situation of all financial units.  
Information can reduce or improve the welfare in a market setting decision-
making context. Thus, the negative effect on welfare of an increase in the available 
information to the market participants is due to changes in prices, induced by a change 
in information, that alter the budget sets of financial units. 
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If the markets are incomplete, there is a second welfare effect. Additional 
information allows the agents to achieve a larger set of state-contingent payoffs by 
conditioning their portfolios on this information. Thus, the value of information in a 
financial market economy has a negative component and a positive component. 
Regarding the welfare changes, the financial units’ welfare before a change in 
information is different from the agents’ welfare after a change in information. If 
markets are sufficiently incomplete, equilibrium welfare effects are arbitrary: there are 
informational changes that improve or worsen the situation of all agents or of any 
subset of agents. Therefore, the pecuniary externalities created by the price changes 
can outweigh the value that a change in information might otherwise have for any 
individual agent. Thus, when both the positive and negative effects are present, the net 
effect can go in any direction. The welfare effects involve changes in real asset payoffs 
(through changes in the price level), in asset prices, and in relative spot commodity 
prices (Gottardi & Rahi,  2010). These asset fluctuations may lead to financial 
instability episodes. 
 
2. IMPERFECT MARKETS, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, BILATERAL 
TRANSACTIONS AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
 
In many bilateral transactions, the seller takes into account the possibility of 
being underpaid. There are many types of contracts seen as solutions to the “smart 
buyer problem” (the buyer has superior information about the valuation of the good 
and about the common value component), which involve the grant the seller upside 
participation. In contrast, the lemons problem calls for offering the buyer downside 
protection.  Therefore, the contracts associated with the lemons problem can also be 
the case of the smart buyer problem.  
There are plenty examples of buyers with private information, where the less 
informed seller faces unfavorable terms of trade, which creates a trade friction (the 
inverse of the lemons problem, where the seller knows more about the value of the 
asset, so the buyer hesitates because the seller may overestimate the value to raise the 
price). In the smart buyer problem, the buyer knows more about the value of the asset, 
so the seller hesitates because the buyer may underestimate the value to reduce the 
price. This difference implies different signaling incentives.  
There are three important aspects of the smart buyer problem: a) the problem is 
important in practice; there are trade situations that suffer from the smart buyer 
problem (royalties, cash-equity bids, earn-outs, debt-equity swaps, gross points and 
concessions); b) although the lemons problem (which gives the uninformed party 
downside protection) and the smart buyer problem (which gives the uninformed party 
upside participation) require opposite theoretical solutions, the resulting contracts are 
similar; c) although the two information asymmetries determine identical contracts 
shape, they can lead to an opposite relationship between contract shape and underlying 
value (Burkart & Lee, 2012).  
In the smart buyer problem, the buyer has informational edge over the seller; in 
the lemons problem, the seller has informational edge over the buyer. These two types  
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of situations have different signaling incentives: an informed buyer wants to induce a 
low value, while an informed seller wants to induce a high value. 
This difference is also reflected in the solutions of these problems. Signaling a 
high value involves downside protection, where the uninformed party is recompensed 
if expectations are not met. Signaling a low value involves upside participation, where 
the uninformed party is recompensed if expectations are surpassed (Burkart & Lee, 
2012). These claims (figure 1) represent standard securities, debt for the buyer and 
equity for the seller. 
Therefore, the solutions to the lemons problems and to the smart buyer 
problems result in equivalent contracts. For example, debt issuance is linked to private 
information of the issuer, where debt protects less informed investors from buying 
overvalued securities. But debt is also optimal when the issuer deals with better 
informed investors. Thus, debt protects the issuer from selling undervalued securities. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The graph illustrates the security design solution under limited liability. 
It plots the value of contingent claims granted to the buyer and the seller as functions of 
total realized value (v). The seller receives equity (blue line), and the buyer receives debt 
(red line) 
 
There are many other examples. If we take into consideration the cash-equity 
payments in mergers and acquisitions on the financial markets, the reason for the use 
of equity involves the assumption that target shareholders have private information 
about the target. The use of equity is rational when the acquirer has private information 
about the target. Similarly, royalties can convey information from licensors to 
licensees, but from licensees to licensors also. Analogous arguments are available to 
other contractual provisions, such as earn-outs.   
 
 
 
 
144                                                  Ionescu, C. 
 
The solution equivalence is due to the fact that the claim structure is identical, 
and due to the fact that the lemons problem and the smart buyer problem involve 
asymmetric information about a common value component.  
Because the contractual solutions are identical, real-world contracts are not 
sufficient in identifying the underlying information problem. For example, signaling 
costs are tolerated by the seller in the lemons problem, while they are tolerated by the 
buyer in the smart buyer problem. Thus, the identification of the party that is willing to 
pay the third-party verification helps discriminate between the two information 
problems. But in real life it is not easy to attribute these expenses to any of the party. 
It is possible to study the way the contracts relate to the common value, which 
denotes the distribution of rents across common value types. This relation changes with 
the identity of the informed party.  
Figure 2a illustrates the relation between trade quantity   (the signaling 
instrument) and common value  . If the informed party wants to buy, the relation is 
positive (green line); if the informed party wants to sell, the relation is negative (grey 
line).  
Figure 2b illustrates the linear sharing rules, where the seller’s equity stake   
is the signaling instrument. In smart buyer problems,   and   are inversely related 
(green line), so the sellers receive more equity when common values are lower. In 
lemons problems, they are positively related (grey line), so the sellers keeps more 
equity when common values are higher.                     
If we take into consideration a financial unit that issues equity, we may 
suppose that: 
  the issuer is better informed than the investors (who are unwilling to pay a 
high price if the issuer faces smaller risks); 
  the investors are better informed than the issuer (who wants a high price if 
the investors faces larger risks). 
Thus, uninformed investors buy less for more, and uninformed issuers sell less 
for less, the relations between quantity and price being opposite. 
If we take into consideration a cash-equity offer in mergers and acquisitions on 
the financial markets, the less informed acquirer is not willing to pay a high if the 
owners are not willing to accept a large part of the consideration in equity. In the 
contrary, a more informed acquirer has either to pay a high price either to offer a large 
part of the consideration in equity, the relations between equity considerations and 
price being opposite.  
In some markets, information frictions are mitigated by expert intermediaries, 
who buy and resell the assets. The intermediary contracts imply an information 
problem. If it is taken into consideration an entity that wants to sell but it has no 
expertise in assessing its value ( ), the seller contracts a specialized dealer, that buys 
the asset for   and pays a supplementary amount if the asset is resold for more than 
, where   is the dealer commission. Because the dealer is experienced, the last 
buyer is unable to buy the asset for less than  .  
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Figure 2: The two graphs illustrate that the smart buyer problem (informed purchase) 
and the lemons problem (informed sale) can imply opposite predictions about the 
relationship between the underlying common value and the signaling instrument. The left 
graph shows this for trade rationing; the right graph shows it for linear sharing rules 
 
Therefore, informed intermediation has two advantages: a) the intermediary 
does not buy the asset for its own use, case in which the seller is back to the original 
problem; b) the resale generates information regarding  , highlighting the inefficient 
signaling through trade failures. In the real life, such informed intermediation is 
provided by market-makers (the case of stock exchanges) or underwriters (the case of 
capital markets). 
Regarding the information problem, it is important to emphasize that the 
intermediary has different contracts with the informed parties and with the uninformed 
parties. In the case of the smart buyer problem, the intermediary has a contingent 
contract with the seller and a cash transaction with the buyer. In the case of the lemons 
problem, the intermediary has a contingent contract with the buyer and a cash 
transaction with the seller. This asymmetry regarding the way that the intermediary 
interacts with the seller and the buyer implies an information problem. 
 
3. COMPLETE / INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
 
Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects (the 
failure of a bank leads to the failure of other banks even if they are not directly affected 
by the initial shock), leading to financial crises, which are the most severe form of 
financial instability. The risk of contagion depends on the pattern of interbank linkages. 
In a complete market structure, banks hold deposits with banks of other regions in 
order to ensure the necessary liquidity against liquidity shocks in their region, which  
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may have two meanings: a) a geographical region; b) any grouping of banks. If one 
bank faces a shock, it has to acquire the necessary liquidity by withdrawing on its 
deposits at other banks before liquidating long-term assets (premature liquidation of 
the long-dated asset is very costly; for example, abandoning the real investment 
projects or interrupting the long-term lending relationships). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. “Complete market structure” 
 
The interbank market can redistribute liquidity, but cannot create liquidity, 
which may lead to a contagion if the aggregate liquidity need is higher than the 
aggregate holdings of liquid assets. In order not to liquidate the long term assets, banks 
withdraw their deposits at other banks, spreading their illiquidity throughout the 
financial system. The possibility of contagion depends on the structure of interbank 
claims. Therefore, there is a small probability to occur in a complete structure of 
claims, where every bank has symmetric linkages with all other banks in the economy 
(figure 3). Incomplete market structures, where banks have links only to the 
neighboring institutions (figure 4) are more fragile. 
Interbank lending arises from consumers’ uncertainty about when and where to 
consume. Interbank credit lines diminish the overall amount of liquid (but costly) 
reserves. Thus, contagion can appear even if all banks are solvent. If a high proportion 
of depositors from a great number of banks believe that they will not obtain payment, it 
is beneficial to them to withdraw their deposits, meaning that the banks will liquidate 
their investments, and will determine a bank run where all the depositors will withdraw 
their deposits and the banking instability transforms into financial instability. With the 
exception of the contagion resulted from the behavior of the non-banks, the interbank 
connections enhance the resiliency (the ability to resist shocks) of the financial system; 
the weaker the resiliency, the higher chances of endogenous financial instability 
episodes. Thus, the interbank credit lines offer a subsidy to the insolvent bank, which 
will spread part of its losses to other banks (Upper & Worms, 2001). 
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Figure 4. “Incomplete market structure” 
 
Therefore, interbank lending contributes to loosening market discipline. A 
complete structure of claims diminishes the risk of contagion, while incomplete 
structures increase the fragility of the financial system, leading to financial instability. 
 
4. INTER-DEALER TRADING, MARKET MECHANISM AND FINANCIAL 
INSTABILITY 
 
Regarding the determinants of agents' choice of market mechanism in the 
context of inter-dealer trading, in some dealership markets (the foreign exchange 
market, the government bond market, the stock exchange equity market), inter-dealer 
trading has a great percentage from the total trading. In addition, these markets offer 
dealers two choices of trading mechanisms: a) dealers can trade directly with each 
other; b) dealers can place an order through one of the inter-dealer brokers (Saporta, 
1997). 
The inter-dealer trading has important effects on the price formation 
mechanism. In the foreign exchange market, the inter-dealer trading has an important 
role in disseminating the information.  
To study the dealers' choice of inter-dealer trading and to analyze the 
implications of the choices for the outside investors, it can be used a three-stage model: 
1) dealers decide if they enter the market-making of the asset; 2) one of the dealers 
trades with an informed outside client; 3) the dealer, who has executed the outside 
investor's order, decides whether it wishes to unwind the inventory trading directly 
with another dealer or whether to submit an order to the inter-dealer broker (Saporta, 
1997). 
The direct inter-dealer market is a standard competitive quote-driven market, 
where price competition between dealers leads to price schedules that in equilibrium 
reduces to nullity the expectations of the dealers of making a positive surplus. The 
inter-dealer broking system is a typical order-driven trading mechanism, where dealers 
pay a fixed brokerage fee in order to submit their orders to the broker. The broker 
clears the market and determines the price. In equilibrium, dealers expect a positive 
surplus.  
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Trading motivation in the inter-dealer market is a result of the second stage 
dealer-client, where the client have private information about the value of the asset and 
wants to trade a fixed amount for liquidity reasons. The market is opaque (for example, 
the foreign exchange market, the government bond market, the stock exchange equity 
market), where the transaction details about the trade between the client and the dealer 
remain confidential until the end of the inter-dealer trading session.  
The dealer's third stage choice of inter-dealer trading is related with the 
number of dealers who enter the market-making industry, because there are differences 
between the institutional structures of the two inter-dealer market mechanisms. In the 
direct market dealers compete in prices; in the brokered market dealers compete in 
demand schedules. 
If there are two or more dealers that compete for the incoming inter-dealer 
order flow, the risk-sharing opportunities from the direct market are not dependent of 
the number of dealers. But the risk-sharing opportunities from the brokered inter-dealer 
market increase the number of dealers who enter the market-making industry. Thus, 
there are some dealers that outweigh the competitive benefits of the bilateral market if 
the number of dealers exceeds the number the risk-sharing benefits of the brokered 
market; in this situation, the brokered market predominates; in an opposite, the direct 
market predominates. 
Regarding the transparency and information asymmetry on dealers' choice of 
inter-dealer trading venue, the increase in information asymmetry or financial market 
transparency diminishes the liquidity of the brokered order-driven market much more 
than in the situation of the direct quote-driven market. Therefore, the increase in 
information asymmetry or market transparency determines an increase in the required 
number of market participants needed for the order-driven system to prevail. 
But, in the absence of information asymmetry, a raise of the risk-aversion, a 
raise of the volatility of the asset and a raise of the liquidity trading shifts the inter-
dealer trading from the direct market to the broker (this is applicable for those markets 
where trading on private information is not significant, such as the government bond 
market), which finally leads to financial instability.  
 
5. IMPERFECT INFORMATION, MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL 
INSTABILITY 
 
Regarding the effects of imperfect information on the monetary policy rules, 
there are three important aspects: a) setting a self-oriented monetary policy rule which 
responds to unexpected shocks in a predictable manner leads to welfare gains, even if 
central banks do not have perfect information about the financial sector; b) better 
information about the state of the world economy has ambiguous welfare implications 
(on the one hand, better information allows policymakers to respond appropriately to 
common shocks; on the other hand, because the better information allows 
policymakers to respond to a wider set of shocks, this can generate spillover effects 
which are not necessarily internalized); c) gains from international monetary co-
ordination under perfect information are greatest when productivity shocks are 
negatively correlated between countries (Tan & Tanaka, 2008).  
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The gains from international monetary policy co-ordination are sensitive to the 
economic frictions, like financial market structure, nominal rigidity and exchange rate 
pass-through. International monetary co-ordination is irrelevant in a world of complete 
financial markets, because the availability of state-contingent assets eliminates the 
need for international risk-sharing through monetary policy. The gains from 
international monetary co-ordination are higher in the situation of the incomplete 
financial markets than under the situation of financial autarky. In addition, the gains 
from international monetary co-ordination are higher when financial markets are 
incomplete and the initial holdings of foreign assets are asymmetric across countries.  
In addition, the activist policies (Nash policies or coordinated policies) induce 
high levels of welfare gains in comparison to passive policies if central banks learn 
about the ‘true’ monetary transmission mechanism and if central banks update their 
beliefs regarding the foreign productivity shocks after observing domestic shocks.  
Therefore, the presence of nominal rigidities and credit frictions leads to a 
inflation variability - output variability trade-off. Since an output reduction leads to a 
reallocation of resources toward less productive agents, it will result in large future 
deviations of output from its efficient level. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the 
rise in inflation after the shock and the reduction of the future output relative to its 
efficient level. A large reduction in output variability can be achieved by allowing only 
a small amount of inflation variability. Thus, the financial instability reflects itself in 
economic instability, affecting the real economy as well.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
To sum up, information plays an extremely important role in the financial 
markets. Thus, given that financial market participants interact between them 
depending on the available information and depending on the risk aversion, there are 
processes in the markets that can be destabilizing, both for financial markets and for 
other markets (through spillover effects), but also for entire national economy, regional 
economy or world economy. 
Thus, the behavioral patterns caused by information and / or the type of 
information have either wave-type effects (which erodes the resistance of the financial 
system over time in a slowly manner) or mass-type effect (which sharply erodes the 
resistance of the financial system). Understanding the information and understanding 
the lack of information and the behavior induced by the lack of information are 
essential in approaching the action strategies of the financial market participants, which 
may trigger the mechanism of propagation of financial instability. 
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